Simon Margolin
I am an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara in the Department of Economics. I obtained a PhD in Economics from Princeton University in May 2025.
I study Macroeconomics, Public Finance and Labor.
You can find my CV here.Â
Contact information:
Twitter: @simon_margolin
2127 North Hall
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210
Working papers
Abstract: This paper studies how climate externalities change antitrust targeting. We build a general-equilibrium oligopoly model with antitrust enforcement and greenhouse gas emissions, in which antitrust authorities trade off lower market-power distortions against higher emissions from expanded output. We derive an emissions-adjusted Lerner index that combines the private markup wedge with marginal climate damages and accounts for cross-sector reallocation. Calibrating the model with U.S. concentration, emissions, and output data, we show that the correction substantially changes enforcement priorities. Polluting industries become less attractive targets, while cleaner industries move up. Our quantification shows that emissions-adjusted targeting substantially reduces the environmental cost of antitrust enforcement.
Abstract: This paper studies the unequal incidence of corporate taxes across firms and its implications for macroeconomic outcomes. I develop a dynamic general equilibrium Harberger model with heterogeneous firms. I show that corporate tax cuts lead to stronger wage increases at capital-intensive firms, and that this heterogeneous effect, combined with general equilibrium dynamics, creates a discrepancy between micro and macro estimates of their impact on workers' income and welfare. I validate the core firm-level mechanisms using French administrative employer-employee data and multiple tax reforms. I use the reduced-form estimates to discipline the model, and quantify the short vs. long run, and micro vs. macro consequences of corporate tax reforms. When firm heterogeneity and general equilibrium dynamics are taken into account, workers bear a relatively small share of the aggregate corporate tax burden.
Abstract: This paper investigates the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI) and explores how UI affects the quality of the job-seeker pool. Using a directed search model with endogenous search effort and asymmetric information between workers and recruiters, I show that higher levels of UI can exacerbate adverse selection by incentivizing low-productivity workers to apply for high-wage jobs and crowd out productive applicants. However, the model reveals a mitigating effect: increased UI reduces the number of applications from low-productivity workers, alleviating this adverse selection inefficiency. The model is calibrated using data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations and the Current Population Survey to quantify these two forces and the welfare effects of unemployment insurance, showing that the current level of benefits implemented in the US is close to, but slightly below, the optimal one.
Work in progress
Firm-specific Human Capital and Labor Market Power, with John Grigsby and Gianluca Violante
Abstract: We analyze the implications of firm-specific human capital for labor market power and the transmission of productivity shocks to wages. We incorporate firm-specific human capital into a model of the labor market featuring oligopsonistic employers. Our findings reveal that the degree of pass-through from productivity shocks to wages depends on the specificity of these shocks. When workers experience productivity gains that are limited to a subset of firms, employers capture a substantial portion of these gains through wider markdowns. Furthermore, we show that wider markdowns may signal either higher labor market concentration (e.g. driven by reduced firm entry) or stronger technological specificity (e.g. due to a higher division of labor). These different sources of labor market power carry distinct policy implications. While market concentration calls for antitrust interventions and restrictions on non-compete agreements, addressing technological specificity may require education policies or active labor market policies aimed at broadening worker skills.
Corporate Bankruptcy as Worker Insurance, with Maxime Gravoueille and Thomas Zuber
Abstract: This paper studies the trade-offs in reorganization bankruptcy (e.g. Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code) between protecting workers from job displacement and reallocating resources to more productive firms. Using data from over 148,000 bankruptcy filings in France between 2008 and 2017, matched with administrative employer-employee panel data, we document the costs of delayed reallocation by showing that most firms undergoing reorganization have experienced permanent productivity shocks, with a majority eventually facing liquidation. On the other hand, we document the insurance benefits of reorganization by comparing worker outcomes in firms that experience liquidation versus those that reorganize. We find that reorganization significantly reduces long-run earnings losses. We develop a model that captures the optimal allocation of reorganization and liquidation by bankruptcy courts under imperfect information, as they struggle to distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks when firms file for bankruptcy. Reorganization allows extended observation periods, enabling courts to better assess firm viability. This framework highlights the benefits of reorganization during periods of aggregate uncertainty, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Optimal bankruptcy procedures balance resource reallocation, worker protection, and informational advantages.
